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north Vietnam. Hong Kong is caught between this upper and nether millstone." Sir Geoffrey Howe told us on 14 June, after he had attended the Geneva Conference, that the United States Government seemed “to support the prospect of indefinite accumulation of people in places like Hong Kong and that is clearly not a tenable position.”2 We believe the American position fails totally to understand the seriousness of the problem or its damaging consequences both to the people of Hong Kong and the Vietnamese. We recommend that at the very least the British Government should make it absolutely clear to the United States Government that while the latter remains "unalterably opposed to the forced repatriation of Vietnamese asylum- seekers", it must accept the responsibility either for their resettlement, or for their accommo- dation pending voluntary repatriation.
5.7. The roots of the problem are entangled with questions of the international status of Vietnam and the availability of development aid, with Vietnam's policies in Cambodia and with the attitude of its allies and neighbours, notably the Soviet Union and China. Discussions were held between Sir Geoffrey Howe and the Vietnamese Foreign Minister at the Geneva Conference. Vietnam must be encouraged to take steps itself to prevent the huge and increasing outflow. It may be that the Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, and the building up of the Vietnamese economy could together-through the aid and trade which would follow those developments-break the vicious circle of poverty, emigration and destitution.
5.8. We are also convinced that China has a role to play. This view is reinforced by reports we have received that many of the so-called Boat People are in fact travelling by bus from Vietnam into the People's Republic and only taking a boat thereafter from Chinese ports. Britain must take vigorous steps to secure a much more positive and responsible approach by Beijing.
VI. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
I Introduction
(i) The nature of the United Kingdom's obligation to Hong Kong has particular import- ance because of Hong Kong's unique position as the United Kingdom's only colony or dependent territory whose people cannot exercise the fundamental right of self determination. Also unique are the fundamental conditions of the Territory's exist- ence. The lease, on which 92 per cent of the land area (ie the New Territories) is held expires on 30 June 1997. It was therefore imperative to reach an agreement with China to protect as much as possible of the integrity of Hong Kong well ahead of that time. It was in recognition of this unique situation that the British Government entered into negotiations which resulted in the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong of 1984. (paragraph 1.6)
(ii) Britain's obligations stem fundamentally from the unique characteristic of Hong Kong which we described above, and from the provisions of the Joint Declaration which the British Government entered into to satisfy those obligations. (paragraph 1.8) (iii) We believe that the British Government must review the specific implementation of
its obligations towards the people of Hong Kong. (paragraph 1.10)
II The Joint Declaration and the Basic Law
(iv) We have concluded that despite what has happened and the inevitable calls to tear up the Sino-British Agreement, reneging on the Joint Declaration and breaking off all negotiations with China for the foreseeable future is simply not an option. (paragraph 2.3)
(v) We believe that the People's Republic of China (PRC) may find it necessary to give stronger guarantees based on the Joint Declaration and reflected in the provisions of the Basic Law, in order to re-establish the confidence and trust of Hong Kong and the rest of the world in the Territory's future stability, security and prosperity. (paragraph 2.3)
IQ 934.
2 Q 1004.
'Mr Lawrence Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State speaking at the Geneva Conference.
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