regional centre in which non-volunteers could be held pending their eventual repatriation. Otherwise there was a grave risk that the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA), set up by the ICIR in 1989, might collapse.
46.
In July 1990 the United States announced that they were willing to contemplate the return to Vietnam of migrants who had been screened out and found not to qualify as refugees, and who were not opposed to return (the "grey area" cases). In September the United Kingdom, Hong Kong and Vietnamese Governments reached agreement on simplified arrangements for the return of volunteers and on new procedures to cover the return of "grey area" cases. In December 1990 23 non-volunteers were repatriated under those arrangements.
47.
In recognition of the need for action to tackle the root causes of the Vietnamese exodus, namely poverty and lack of opportunity for personal advancement, the European Commission announced in December 1990 a 2-year 10 million ECU programme of reintegration assistance for returnees. The United Kingdom subsequently pledged £3 million to this programme, in addition to our share of the EC contribution (approximately £5.6 million).
48. In September 1991, under continuing pressure from Her Majesty's Government, the Vietnamese unexpectedly indicated their willingness to take back all those found not to be refugees, whether they volunteered or not, in an orderly fashion. The following month agreement was reached on the arrangements for the return of those who, having already returned voluntarily to Vietnam, had gone back to Hong Kong in the hope of receiving further UNHCR reintegration assistance (the "double-backers"). Shortly afterwards the United Kingdom, Hong Kong and Vietnam signed a Statement of Understanding on an Orderly Repatriation Programme (ORP) covering all non-refugees. The Vietnamese reconfirmed their undertakings given in June 1989 that no
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