TNAG-2707-FCO40-3913-Hong-Kong-political-parties-Cooperative-Resources-Centre-(CR-1993 — Page 23

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

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HONG KONG: CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY

MR ALLEN LEE'S DELEGATION

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Thank you for your letter of 18 January and for the brief for the call by Mr Allen Lee and the members of the Cooperative Resources Centre, which took place this morning. The Foreign Secretary was present.

The Prime Minister said that he had read the Centre's paper carefully. We were embarking on an important period with the LegCo debate. A heavy responsibility would fall on the shoulders of LegCo members in ensuring that the right decisions were taken for Hong Kong. He noted that there were some points of disagreement with Mr Patten in the Centre's paper. The Governor's proposals were based on close consultation between him and London and we supported them. They were the right way to meet the wish of the people of Hong Kong for a greater say in their own affairs. They were nonetheless proposals. They were not etched in tablets of stone. The Governor was prepared to consider the views of others provided that elections would be open, fair and acceptable to the people of Hong Kong. The Governor would be putting proposals to LegCo following his consultations with ExCo. He would also publish a compendium of the proposals put forward by others. All this amounted to an unprecedented amount of public debate. We would accept LegCo's decision.

Mr Lee said that his group had had a good meeting with Mr Patten on 6 January. There was great uncertainty and stress in Hong Kong over the lack of dialogue between the British Government and China. The issue was how to resolve that deadlock. He was not interested in a post mortem on what had happened or in attributing right and wrong. The situation was too serious for that. We needed to find a way to break the impasse since Sino-British relations were at an all time low. One particular British company had just been singled out for criticism by the Chinese. The Prime Minister would know how serious

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