•
Mr Galsworthy
FRED LI WAH-MING
CONFIDENTIAL
FROM:
PP/Reeting Print
©
A R Paul
Hais 011/2
DATE:
25 March 1993
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY cc:
Mr Ricketts, HKD Mr Llewellyn, GH
16 Apr
га
REGISTRY Action Taken
1.
Fred Li (Meeting Point) told me on 24 March that, as roots party dependent on the popular vote, Meeting Point had to listen closely to the views of the community. Now the overwhelming message from the party's supporters was:
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they were fed up with the current row with China and wanted something done to bring it to an end;
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they wanted more democracy but attached relatively greater importance to convergence, because this meant continuity and certainty through 1997;
they did not think that the question of Hong Kong representation was sufficiently important to become an obstacle to talks.
2.
Ama
Li added three glosses of his own:
like it or not, and despite the Governor's best efforts in his TV interviews etc, the decision to gazette on 12 March had backfired against the Governor. Lu Ping had handled his press conference skilfully: he had come across as moderate and reasonable, and his metaphor about the Governor having 'closed two doors' had convinced most people that the ball was now in the Governor's court. People were waiting for an initiative from the Governor to break the impasse. Failure to do so would further weaken the Governor's standing in the community.
- no one really believed that Michael Sze or Peter Lai really represented 'Hong Kong people'. Their loyalty was to the British Hong Kong Government. So the question of their exact status in the talks was relatively unimportant to the community.
the Governor should not be misled by the enthusiastic reception he received during his visits at the local level. People liked and respected him but he could not count on their unconditional support. If they felt that he was endangering their livelihood and future, they would demand that he stopped. That point had not yet been reached, but we were getting closer to it. The difference was that the majority of the community would still be around after 1997; the Governor would not.
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3. I took Fred Li through the events leading up to the decision to gazette, stressing that it was the Chinese who had made gazetting inevitable; that the Governor had done everything he reasonably could to make talks possible, including repeated postponements of gazetting for which he had been strongly criticised at the time; and that it was the Chinese who had slammed the door by reopening points which had previously been agreed.
4. Li conceded that all this could well be true and that Lu Ping's version of events could be a lie. But he wondered whether the Governor and his advisers sincerely wanted talks. He had gained the clear impression (from a conversation with the Chief Secretary) that the HKG was not enthusiastic about talks and were gloomy about the prospects. Some people believed that the Governor's strong preference was that there should be no talks, because he feared that they would result in a strong dilution of his political package.
5.
I countered that this was absurd. I reminded him that the Governor was willing to talk to the Chinese on the basis of the JD, the BL and the seven diplomatic exchanges; that he had always been open to alternative proposals from any quarter; that he had bent over backwards to facilitate talks; and that he had consistently acted in a moderate manner, unlike the other side, whose personal attacks were becoming increasingly offensive and
unreasonable.
6.
Li said that if all this was true, the Governor should take a new initiative to break the deadlock. The sooner the better. The "Hong Kong representation" obstacle should somehow be removed. That was what the community wanted.
7.
I said that all this sounded somewhat surprising coming from someone who I had always taken to be a strong believer in democracy and a supporter of the Governor's package. Li said that his personal position had not changed but he could not ignore the views of the community. He had been heavily criticised by many of his supporters for voting for the Governor's package last year; and that stand had damaged Meeting Point's relationship with China (see separate note on Anthony Cheung).
8. On the timing of the introduction of the legislation to LegCo, Li said he favoured waiting until after the Easter recess. At that point, if there really was no prospect of talks, the HKG should go ahead. But that was a decision for the government to take and it was not right to shift the responsibility for taking difficult decision onto LegCo's shoulders. There were many issues on when the government ignored members' views, why act differently on a matter such as this, which fell clearly into the government's sphere of responsibility?
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9.
Li said, however, that once the legislation was introduced, Meeting Point would want to get on with considering it. The process would be a time consuming one. He declined however to say how Meeting Point would vote on the specific elements of the package, commenting only that Meeting Point members would need to decide its stand and vote collectively as a party, not as individuals.
10.
We talked a bit about the through train. Li said Meeting Point wanted a through train but would not be too worried if in 1997 they had to get off the British train and get on the Chinese one. He thought the Chinese would have great difficulty in getting rid of Martin Lee and Szeto Wah in 1997; but their task would be made much easier if, following a breakdown of Sino- British cooperation, the through train concept were dead.
Comment
11. My assessment is that Meeting Point will:
voice little or no public support for HKG in present circumstances;
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support a decision to introduce legislation on 21 April but if and only if there is clear evidence that we have made every effort to get talks going and that all hope of talks is dead;
- oppose attempts to delay consideration of the legislation once it has been introduced;
support radical modifications to the Election Committee and (probably) the functional constituency proposals (although the latter is close to Li's heart); and
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try to repair their relationship with China, even at the expense of compromising their "democratic" aspirations.
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AR Paul
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