principles and, after their experience of October 1992, may
well seek written understandings covering the remaining
years of British rule in order to guard against further
surprises. They are in a strong position, not least because
of the time
pressures on the Hong Kong government if
legislation is to be introduced in time for the 1994-5
elections. But they will probably be prepared to make some
concessions, particularly on the economic side.
The British, as in 1982, will seek to escape the
net of principle and concentrate on detail; but, in the
nature of things in Hong Kong, they have been dealt the
weaker hand and the larger concessions will no doubt be
expected from them. These will
These will involve hard decisions,
balancing retreats from democracy as promised by the
Governor against the effects on Hong Kong of permanent
confrontation. There will always be the option of
withdrawal from the talks and appeal to the Legislative
Council; but such a break would probably prove
irretrievable; and the consequences would be so serious and
so unwelcome to Hong Kong, which remains after all the whole
object of the exercise, that it must be presumed that this
will remain the remoter contingency and that an eventual
agreement will be reached.
If an agreement is attained, it will no doubt be
argued by many on the British side that the results, however
small, were well worth the losses inflicted on Hong Kong
and on Sino-British relations in the course of the crisis,
indeed that the result could not have been obtained in any
other way. It may be claimed that only thus could honour be
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