TNAG-2703-FCO40-3909-Memoirs-of-Sir-Percy-Cradock--diplomat-and-sinologist-1993 — Page 28

а

speech two weeks in advance, their request that they should

consulted (which in their eyes

be

probably

meant

negotiation) before the speech was delivered was rejected.

This was contrary to previous practice and, as they saw it,

to provisions in the Joint Declaration, which required

closer consultation in the later stages of the transitional

period. The substance of the proposals, by greatly widening

the electorate, in their view contravened earlier Sino-

British understandings expressed in the Joint Declaration,

the Basic Law and the exchanges of letters on directly

elected seats of 1989-1990. (The British naturally

contested this reading). The Chinese rejected the right of

Legco, to them a purely advisory body, to pronounce on the

future of their territory. To them the reforms and the

manner of their promulgation represented a 180 degree turn

in British policy on cooperation and convergence. They went

further and claimed to detect a conspiracy aiming to

enhance Hong Kong's independence and spread the virus of

democracy to the mainland. The fact that the United States,

Canadian and Australian governments warmly endorsed the

Governor's constitutional plans confirmed Peking in the

instinctive suspicion that there was international backing

for such a plot.

A confrontation rapidly developed. On the Chinese

side there was sustained invective and threats of

abolishing the legislature in 1997 if the new arrangements

were implemented and setting up before that date a "second

kitchen", that is an alternative centre of authority for

There could be little doubt of the

the territory.