constant
policy during this period did impose its strains and demand
more than usual self-control on the part of London and Hong
Kong. However logical and justified, the
compromises and accommodations with China did not come
easily; and even when spectacular settlements were
achieved, as over the airport, the period of goodwill and
cooperation they engendered proved disappointingly brief.
The Chinese were always difficult; after 1989 they grew
even more antagonistic and demanding. As they saw it, they
were engaged in the final stages of the struggle for Hong
Kong, facing all kinds of capitalist wiles. The task of
British officials engaged regularly with them, as in the
Joint Liaison Group, called for superhuman patience.
Moreover, as the period of British rule dwindled, we were
being driven, on grounds of pure practicality, into wider
consultations with the successor regime and on terms which
progressively less favourable. This was
would grow
inherent in the fact of the transition and the ultimate
transfer.
Reduced to its most precise form, the charge of
the critics was that we had overestimated Chinese strength
and underestimated their tolerance. All our experience,
both in the 1983-1984 period and later, argued strongly
against such a judgement. But there was no conclusive way of
proof, except by trial. And in October, 1992, probably more
by error than by intention, Britain and Hong Kong found
themselves engaged in a practical demonstration.
The issue arose over representative government
and the 1995 elections, The new Governor, Mr.Patten, was
!
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