The negotiations,
however,
proved fruitless.
They wound on into the summer, the autumn and the winter of
1993, seventeen rounds in all, over a hundred and sixty
Some hours of talks. But they made no 'progress: though the
British offered some significant concessions, the Chinese
On the major in proved unyielding. This rigidity no doubt reflected the
fact that they had been taken to the limit of their
tolerance by the earlier negotiations: they had reached a
political settlement and, as they had repeatedly warned,
they were not prepared to reopen it. But it may also have
reflected uncertainty in Peking about the succession to
Deng Xiaoping: noone had the confidence to be flexible.
For the Hong Kong government there were apparently also
technical constraints: dates before which legislation had
to be passed if it was to be ready for the district
elections of 1994 and the legislative elections
of
1995.
At the time of writing (the end of November 1993)
it is clear that the talks have collapsed and, though the
consequential decisions have not yet been taken, it seems
highly likely that the British and Hong Kong governments
are now prepared to take unilateral action and to submit
the Patten proposals in some form to the Legislative
Council.
If this course is followed, we must expect a
renewed and probably final confrontation with China. The
Legislative Council may of course refuse the cup put to
them and cast out the proposals; or they may pass only a
watered-down version. But it is unlikely that these
ici
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