f
slowly and painfully the Chinese came to tolerate the idea
of even an element of direct elections. When, in late 1983,
I first raised the possibility of direct elections before
1997 the reaction was one of horrified dismissal. It was a
long road from there to the 1990 understanding, which
accepted 18 directly elected seats in 1991 and envisaged
half the legislature directly elected in 2003.
Much was also made of an alleged failure by London
to involve Hong Kong further in the negotiations on its
future. The charge rested largely on an inability to
appreciate the strength of Peking's objections to any
direct Hong Kong participation. This included an angry
refusal to deal with Hong Kong as an independent point in
the triangle, total resistance to any idea of a referendum
in 1984, and non-recognition of the official position of
Chinese Exco and Legco members. If it wished to help Hong
Kong, Britain had to use the only channels available. As
regards consultation between the metropolitan and colonial
governments, this was close and constant: Exco were privy
to every move. Wider consultation, as with the Legislative
Council or the Hong Kong public, during secret negotiations
would have been unprecedented and impracticable, even if
Peking had acquiesced.
Nevertheless, there were
symptoms of malaise and
they were given a new edge by the events of June 1989. In
that atmosphere of outrage and emotion the rationale of the
Joint Declaration and of Sino-British co-operation was
forgotten by the commentators and the wish that things had
been otherwise became obsessive. We heard much more of the
4
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