TNAG-2702-FCO40-3908-Memoirs-of-Sir-Percy-Cradock--diplomat-and-sinologist-1993 — Page 42

can neither create nor direct'. Those in charge of Sino-

British relations in the years of co-operation perhaps

overerestimated their capacity to direct events and to

impose a rational framework on irrational forces. They

discounted the still unexhausted reserves of prejudice

and emotion on each side, the deeper currents in the

stream.

It is sad to have to leave the Hong Kong story at

this point, with so much to do and so much that has been

done brought into question, with the main issue still

unresolved and the risk SO high that damaging and

irrevocable decisions will be taken. We are back on that

seems,

famous window ledge from which the Unofficials were more

than once rescued in the 1982-4 negotiations, and this

time saddled with stronger suicidal impulses. But it

would be wrong to be totally despondent. Even if, as it

we are condemned to follow the dark scenario, the

whole achievement of the time of co-operation will not be

lost. Those thirteen years, from 1979, when the issue of

the lease was first raised, indirectly and with some

trepidation, during Sir Murray MacLehose's visit to

Peking, have left a foundation work of agreements and

habits of consultation which cannot be entirely erased. In

particular, even in the worst case, the Joint Declaration,

the territory's sheet-anchor, should survive,

under strain. If that happens, it will be ironic, though

providential, that the main product of a rejected policy

should be the insurance against the full consequences of

its successor and should

survive, though

supply the safety net against

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