TNAG-2702-FCO40-3908-Memoirs-of-Sir-Percy-Cradock--diplomat-and-sinologist-1993 — Page 40

governmental

an

manouevres, by what they see as a subordinate body, will

have much impact on the Chinese, who will concentrate on

British government policy and the rupture in the inter-

negotiations. Unless there is a major

retreat by London (on the grounds that Hong Kong does not

want a confrontation), the Chinese threats, of setting up

alternative centre of authority at once, and of

dismantling the legislature in 1997, will undoubtedly be

implemented; and there will be an ugly stand-off over the

territory in the remaining years of transition. Observers

will be driven to the conclusion that the antagonisms of

one hundred and fifty years were spectres not after all to

be so easily laid; and Britain and China will end their

dealings on Hong Kong as they began, in misunderstanding

and hostility. With the difference, that this time

superior power will not rest with Britain.

In such an event, it will no doubt be argued in

justification that honour required us to leave Hong Kong

with an improved level of democracy, with credible

elections in 1995, and with the attributes of a free and

open society. But in fact the effect of the confrontation

will be to ensure that the legislature is uprooted in 1997

and democracy thereby permanently impaired. The 1995

elections will be held in circumstances of unprecedented

pressure from the mainland; their results will be negated

two years later; and, as a result of strains on the Chinese

commitment to the political settlement of 1984, the

safeguards for the territory as a free society will be

weakened. In all respects Hong Kong will be left in a worse

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