alternative policy had become a demonstration that,
confrontation apart, there was no alternative: Britain and
China were condemned to cooperate over Hong Kong. Though
there was a natural reluctnce to admit it, the two
governments were now back on the traditional course of
ndegotiation between capitals, as practised by the
mandarins and Sinologues of the previous decade.
The negotiations would of course be tough. The
subject was highly charged and significant damage had been
done. Chinese suspicions had been reinforced and their
hostile analysis of British policy seemingly vindicated.
Hong Kong society had been polarised and political
intrusion from the mainland accelerated. The terms that
might have been secured in quiet discussions in October
would be much harder to obtain after six months of trench
warfare. But at least there was a return to rational
discussion.
It is difficult to predict the outcome of the
talks. At the time of writing (September 1993) they have not
made great progress. The Chinese will no doubt press for
proofs of British "sincerity", a return to pre-Patten
principles and, after their experience of October 1992, may
well seek written understandings covering the remaining
years of British rule in order to guard against further
surprises. They are in a strong position, not least because
of the time pressures on the Hong Kong government if
legislation is to be introduced in time for the 1994-5
elections. But they will probably be prepared to make some
concessions, particularly on the economic side.
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