body of opinion at the last AGM that felt public discussion of the issue was unhelpful.
But as 1997 came closer, people
were getting edgy. Some members would fall victim to localisation.
Mr
4. Mr Goodlad observed that many HMOCS members were experienced enough to know that they would not get what they wanted by settling early in the public expenditure round. Cartland said he had assumed that the details of any scheme would need to be discussed over a year or two. The main worry was getting something on the table. Was the concern over the sterling safeguard? The methodology of this had been established in about 50 previous cases and it should be relatively simple to adapt this model. The fear was that HMG would break precedent just to save money. This would be seen as bad faith and ellicit a strong reaction. HMOCS were not asking for more than had been given in previous cases. The majority of members knew there was no point in agitating but the Committee was starting to lose credibility. There was a feeling that they were not being tough enough with HMG Mr Goodlad argued that the Committee had been as strong as they could have been and that doing anything else would have made no difference. The FCO were also doing all that could be done.
5. Mr Cartland said that active lobbying of Parliament in the 1950s and 1960s had been helpful at the time. HMOCS had held back now because this would immediately cause an adverse reaction in Hong Kong. But a different committee might take a different attitude. He would set this out in a letter to the Minister if that would be helpful. Mr Goodlad was grateful for HMOCS members' forbearance in the interests of Hong Kong.
CC:
PS/Mr Goodlad
Mr Hum
Mr Morris, HKD
PS/Governor Hong Kong
PS/Mr Goodlad
31 May 1993
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