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unwelcome, but a proportion at least could be incurred in any
case if the Governor were unable to secure LEGCO support for meeting the Hong Kong government's share of a larger garrison's costs. Such a financial penalty could also be accompanied by a constitutional row over what would be a public breach of a formal
agreement reached between HMG and the Hong Kong government.
Conclusion and recommendation
15. There are military and political risks and financial penalties associated with a more rapid run down of Hong Kong to a one battalion garrison. The primary risk to the security of Hong Kong would be a rapid breakdown in law and order which would
be beyond the capability of the RHKP to deal with. The chances
of that
that are
are low and would not be significantly increased by reduction of the garrison to a symbolic level.
a symbolic level. But if these circumstances arose not only might a weak garrison make Chinese intervention more likely, but we would inevitably be committed to re-inforcement and the possibility of increased roulement. The political risk relates mainly to Chinese perceptions, and possibly also those in Hong Kong. But we believe, with the Governor, that these risks can be managed and are outweighed by the need to avoid a damaging dispute between the Governor and LEGCO over defence costs at a time when the Hong Kong government faces major political challenges; and the additional flexibility
to meet other military commitments that would result from redeploying forces from Hong Kong. We therefore invite colleagues
to:
a. agree that the land element of the Hong Kong garrison should be reduced by September 1994 to a core of a single effective infantry battalion, with the necessary support services, in accordance with the broad timetable set out in
paragraph 7.
b. note that this will lead to savings in the support area
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