TNAG-2676-FCO40-3873-Hong-Kong-garrison-withdrawal-plan-1993 — Page 88

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unwelcome, but a proportion at least could be incurred in any

case if the Governor were unable to secure LEGCO support for

meeting the Hong Kong government's share of a larger garrison's

costs. Such a financial penalty could also be accompanied by a

constitutional row over what would be a public breach of a formal

agreement reached between HMG and the Hong Kong government.

Conclusion and recommendation

15.

There are military and

and political risks and financial

penalties associated with a more rapid run down of Hong Kong to

a one battalion garrison. The primary risk to the security of Hong Kong would be a rapid breakdown in law and order which would be beyond the capability of the RHKP to deal with. The chances

of that are low and would not be significantly increased by reduction of the garrison to a symbolic level. But if these

circumstances arose not only might a weak garrison make Chinese intervention more likely, but we would inevitably be committed

to re-inforcement and the possibility of increased roulement. The political risk relates mainly to Chinese perceptions, and possibly also those in Hong Kong. But we believe, with the

Governor, that these risks can be managed and are outweighed by

the need to avoid a damaging dispute between the Governor and

LEGCO over defence costs at a time when the Hong Kong government

faces major political challenges; and the additional flexibility

to meet

meet other military commitments that would result from

redeploying forces from Hong Kong. We therefore invite colleagues

to:

a. agree that the land element of the Hong Kong garrison should be reduced by September 1994 to a core of a single effective infantry battalion, with the necessary support services, in accordance with the broad timetable set out in

paragraph 7.

b. note that this will lead to savings in the support area

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