TNAG-2676-FCO40-3873-Hong-Kong-garrison-withdrawal-plan-1993 — Page 74

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with existing plans, over the period 1993/4-1997/8, with the

majority of the savings accruing in 1995/6 and 1996/7. For HMG

there would be savings from reductions in military infrastructure

in Hong Kong and the release of locally employed and enlisted

personnel. However, to the extent that personnel and units are

redeployed rather than disbanded (primarily the UK infantry

battalion), MOD would lose receipts from the Hong Kong

government.

The net effect is likely to be an additional cost of

This further burden

up to £30m over the same five year period.

on the defence budget is unwelcome, but a proportion at least

could be incurred in any case if the Governor were unable to

secure LEGCO support for meeting the Hong Kong government's share

of a larger garrison's costs. Such a financial penalty could

also be accompanied by a constitutional row over what would be a

public breach of a formal agreement reached between HMG and the

Hong Kong government.

Conclusion and recommendation

15.

There are military and political risks and financial

penalties associated with a more rapid run down of Hong Kong to a

one battalion garrison. The primary risk to the security of Hong

Kong would be a rapid breakdown in law and order which would be

beyond the capability of the RHKP to deal with. The chances of

that are low and would not be significantly increased by

reduction of the garrison to a symbolic level. But if these

circumstances arose not only might a weak garrison make Chinese

intervention more likely, but we would inevitably be committed to

re-inforcement and the possibility of increased roulement.

political risk relates mainly to Chinese perceptions, and

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The

PA/S/2.033