TNAG-2676-FCO40-3873-Hong-Kong-garrison-withdrawal-plan-1993 — Page 70

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available to relieve the RHKP on the Sino-Hong Kong border.

latter would release about 700 additional operational policemen

(four police tactical units (PTUS)) for internal security duties

in the Territory. (The current strength of the RHKP is just over

27,000 which normally includes 12 PTUS. After full mobilisation

the RHKP could deploy a total of 31 IS PTUS including the four on

the border.) Should the garrison reduce to a single battalion it

would, without re-inforcement, no longer be capable of relieving

the police on the Sino-Hong Kong border.

6. Such a change would involve some risk (which the Governor

accepts). There would be a diminution in the numbers of police

available to deal with major unrest should that occur. HMG would

not have immediate recourse within the Territory to a body of

British controlled, trained and disciplined manpower to act as a

backstop should the RHKP lose control of the situation. But the

risk would arise only if major internal unrest developed more

quickly than the time needed to re-inforce the garrison (seven to

ten days) and was on such a scale as to threaten to overwhelm the

police. The probability of major unrest is assessed as low, but

it could arise in three ways. First, the Chinese could inspire

disturbances, though this is increasingly unlikely as 1997

approaches. Second, there could be internally generated

disturbances, most probably for economic reasons, eg the collapse

of a major bank. Third, there could be a reaction in Hong Kong

to upheaval or repression in China, as in the massive (but

peaceful) demonstrations which followed the Tiananmen massacre in

1989, possibly combined with an influx of illegal immigrants. If

the RHKP were unable to cope, the Chinese might be tempted to

invoke their oft stated right to intervene themselves.

That

PA/S/2.033

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