TNAG-2676-FCO40-3873-Hong-Kong-garrison-withdrawal-plan-1993 — Page 67

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Under the 1988 Defence Costs Agreement (DCA), 65% of the full costs of the garrison are met by the Hong Kong government. In 1992/3, this amounted to £135m.

3. The garrison has to be withdrawn in its entirety by 30 June 1997. For a period of up to nine months to 30 June 1997 the land element of the garrison will be provided by а single UK battalion. This will be accomplished by

by two battalions in

succession, each of which will complete one temporay unaccompanied deployment of up to four and a half months. Current plans for the period prior to that envisage a staged withdrawal of forces, with the aim of maintaining a balanced military capability, based around two infantry battalions, to carry out the tasks set out above until late 1996, taking into account improvements that have been and continue to be made in the ability of the RHKP to carry out internal security functions. (For example, the RHKP now have full responsibility for policing the Sino-Hong Kong border.) However, the requirement for the land element of the garrison and the RAF and Army helicopters deployed to support it is being increasingly questioned in the Territory. The Finance Committee of LEGCO effectively has a power of veto over any government expenditure proposals. It is the Governor's judgement that the entire DCA could be called into question unless it can be demonstrated to LEGCO that the costs of the garrison are declining steadily from year to year. (He has already ruled out approaching LEGCO for additional funds and the

this ha ahiady lead to clay

Me Hong Kong Government's Hong Kong government has been in breach of the DCA because of an

amison.) unwillingness to seek a supplementary estimate from LEGCO which led to a delay in payment of their share of the full-costs of the garrison in 1992/3.) He therefore sees no alternative to a more rapid run down of the garrison to one based around a single infantry battalion, accepting that this means giving up its capability to support the police without external re-inforcement.

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4.

From the UK point of view,

there is also advantage in

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