TNAG-2676-FCO40-3873-Hong-Kong-garrison-withdrawal-plan-1993 — Page 34

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

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entire DCA could be called into question unless it can be demonstrated to LEGCO that the costs of the garrison are

declining steadily from year to year. (He has ruled out

approaching LEGCO for additional funds and this has already led

to delay in payment of the Hong Kong government's share of the

costs of the garrison.) He therefore sees no alternative to a

more rapid run down of the garrison to one based around a single infantry battalion, accepting that this means giving up its

capability to support the police without external re-inforcement.

i

4. From the UK point of view, there is also advantage in

withdrawing infantry units from Hong Kong and redeploying them to increase our flexibility in dealing with current commitments eg in Northern Ireland and the former Republic of Yugoslavia, though the financial costs to the defence budget would be significant. While an early reduction in the garrison will provide a way to mitigate the Hong Kong government's problems over defence costs,

it will not alter HMG's defence obligations to Hong Kong. The proposal simply moves some of the resources that might be used

back to the UK.

Military implications

5. The requirement for two battalions in Hong Kong, which has been endorsed by the Chiefs of Staff as the minimum appropriate

for current tasks, is based on the assessed threat and a

consequent BFHK concept of operations that requires one battalion to guard key points, the defence estate and reinforcement

reception points (including Kai Tak airport), leaving the other

PA/S/2.033

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