SECRET
3. This would be a significant shift in our approach to Hong Kong. We would in effect be saying that the garrison would no longer have any capacity to carry out an internal security role without re-inforcement and CBF's directive would need to be amended accordingly. We would also need to review the requirement for our re-inforcement plans. It would be appropriate for a decision on this to be taken by Ministers collectively and I suggest that the next major step should be the production of a joint memorandum by the Defence and Foreign Secretaries for submission to OPD(K). We would need to consult the Governor over the drafting of this and indeed, if it were thought necessary for OPD (K) to meet, it may be that Mr Patten should be present. If the Secretary of State is content with this approach, we will start work on a draft Memorandum straight away with the aim of placing it before OPD (K) by the end of May. In the meantime, it would be appropriate to make an initial response to the Governor, setting out the planned way ahead, and taking the opportunity to make it absolutely plain that if the garrison does come down to one battalion, it would not be possible, without re-inforcement, to provide any relief for the police on the border with China in the event of a major internal security problem. Paragraph 2 of the Governor's response implies that this important point (which was made clear in the paper handed over to the Governor) has not been fully appreciated by the Hong Kong government. A short draft to this effect is at Annex B.
4.
The Governor, in his reply, also raises once again the possibility of moving one of the battalions out of Hong Kong to carry out an emergency tour elsewhere. There would in fact be considerable advantage in using one of the Gurkha battalions in Hong Kong to carry out what would be the last emergency tour to Belize from October 1993 to March 1994. This would release 3 Para, who are currently due to take this on, for other commitments should that be necessary. The Army would welcome the increased short term flexibility that this would provide although, again, there would be additional costs to the defence budget which would have to be absorbed in the current financial year. We need to make a decision to do this by 1 June in order to allow the units concerned sufficient notice of the change of plans. Such a decision is not dependant on what we decide on the longer term size and shape of the garrison (though it may influence precisely when we decide to withdraw the UK battalion from Hong Kong) and there is no reason therefore why
why the Secretary of State could not agree to it now, if he is content. If he is, it would be sensible, given that we would need to secure the Hong Kong government's agreement, to include this in the letter to Mr Patten. A short paragraph has therefore been included in the draft at Annex B.
Авиа
DJ BOWEN
Head of Sec (0) (C) MB5302 86144MB
SECRET
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.