TNAG-2676-FCO40-3873-Hong-Kong-garrison-withdrawal-plan-1993 — Page 147

SECRET

unrest should that occur. And HMG would not have immediate

recourse within the Territory to a body of British controlled, trained and disciplined manpower to act as a backstop should the RHKP lose control of the situation. But the risk would arise only

on. But if major internal unrest - in itself assessed as very unlikely developed more quickly than the time needed to re-inforce the

garrison (up to seven days) and was on such а scale as to

threaten to overwhelm the police.

that

be

7. There are currently three battalions in Hong Kong, two of which are Gurkha. It has already been agreed with the Hong Kong

government

one of the Gurkha battalions should

temporarily redeployed to carry out an emergency tour in Belize

between October 1993 to March 1994. When it returns to Hong Kong,

the UK resident battalion, the Black Watch, could be redeployed

to the UK and would be available for other duties. The two Gurkha

battalions left in Hong Kong would then amalgamate, as planned, into a single unit by September 1994. At that point, the resident X

garrison would relinquish its responsibility for internal security (this would entail an amendment to the directive to Commander British Forces (CBF)). Before then we would also need

to review our plans for re-inforcement of Hong Kong to ensure that they reflected this change in the role of the garrison. An accelerated run down along these lines would allow substantial reductions in support facilities to be made (particularly those

associated primarily with UK accompanied service). These are listed in Annex B. It may also be possible to make savings in RAF

helicopter numbers though this will need to be investgated

further. The RN patrol craft are retained primarily for non-

defence reasons, with the full agreement of the

the Hong Kong government, and would not be affected by these proposals.

8. Overall, although there is a modest risk involved, there is military operational benefit in the scheme outlined in the previous paragraph in terms of increasing flexibility elsewhere in the Army at a time when commitments in Northern Ireland and

SECRET