TNAG-2676-FCO40-3873-Hong-Kong-garrison-withdrawal-plan-1993 — Page 130

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Military implications

5. The requirement for two battalions in Hong Kong, which has been endorsed by the Chiefs of Staff as the minimum appropriate,

is based on the assessed threat and a consequent BFHK concept of

operations that requires one battalion to guard key points, the defence estate and reinforcement reception points (including Kai Tak airport), leaving the other available to relieve the RHKP on the Sino-Hong Kong border. The latter would release about 400 additional operational policemen (four police tactical units) for

internal security duties in the Territory. (The current strength of the RHKP is about 26,500 which includes 17 police tactical units.) Should the garrison reduce to a single battalion it would, without re-inforcement, no longer be capable of relieving the police on the Sino-Hong Kong 'border.

6.

Such a change would involve some risk. There would be a diminution in the numbers of police available to deal with major

unrest should that occur. And HMG would not have immediate

recourse within the Territory to a body of British controlled,

trained and disciplined manpower to act as a backstop should the RHKP lose control of the situation. But the risk would arise only if major internal unrest developed more quickly than the time

needed to re-inforce the garrison (seven to ten days) and was on

such a scale as to threaten to overwhelm the police. The

probability of major unrest is assessed by the Hong Kong government as low, but it could arise in three ways. First, the Chinese could inspire disturbances, though this is increasingly unlikely as 1997 approaches. Second, there could be internally generated disturbances, most probably for economic reasons, eg the collapse of a major bank. Third, there could be a reaction in Hong Kong to upheaval or repression in the mainland, as in the massive (but peaceful) demonstrations which followed the

Tiananmen massacre in 1989. If the police were unable to cope, the Chinese might be tempted to invoke their oft stated right to intervene themselves. That temptation would be stronger if the

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