TNAG-2675-FCO40-3872-Hong-Kong-garrison-withdrawal-plan-1993 — Page 172

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LOOSE MINUTE

D/DD Mar & Hels/77/11 - 0280

25 March 1993

Sec (O)(C) - Ms Robertson

Copy to:

PSO/ACAS

DO(FEW)

DMO

DASD

Hd of RP(Army)

GF(Pol) 1

SECRET

HKA 063/1

29 MA: 1993

DESK

EX

Dion Take

ра

M Phuke але

HQBF Hong Kong

FCO(HKD)

Hd of Sec(O)(C)

THE FUTURE OF THE HONG KONG GARRISON: A FASTER RUN DOWN PROGRAMME

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Reference: D/Sec(O)(C)6/7 dated 18 Mar 93.

1. CAS has asked me to comment on your draft paper circulated under cover of the Reference. My main point concerns the level of RAF helicopter support that will be needed during a faster run down programme for the Hong Kong garrison. Future levels of helicopter activity will depend on CBF's operational requirement for the remaining infantry battalion but in general, the smaller the size of the land garrison, the greater the need for air mobility. The existing fleet of 6 RAF Wessex plus 2 reserves could not be reduced if the current requirement to move half an infantry company in 2 lifts were to remain.

2. Unlike infantry units, these ageing aircraft could not be readily re-employed in other operational areas and there are no current plans for the employment of the Hong Kong Wessex beyond 1997. It would seem sensible, therefore, to retain the current Wessex fleet in Hong Kong until final withdrawal to provide maximum mobility for the reduced garrison. Furthermore, if the favoured option to deploy a Naval Task Force, complete with CVS and helicopters, is no longer considered necessary to evacuate the reduced number of personnel in the residual garrison, I believe we should retain an adequate level of Wessex support throughout the final withdrawal phase.

3. On a broader note, it would appear these proposals would provide only limited benefit to the emergency tour plot but would carry both political and financial risks. Nevertheless, with only minor impact on the security of HK, and given the undoubted approval of LEGCO, early withdrawal of a battalion could be presented as a positive gesture rather than as a gap-filling exercise. As a result, this move could benefit politically both Hong Kong and UK Governments without leading to further criticism of Army overstretch.

SECRET

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