SECRET UK EYES A
Sandhurst demonstration company task. Support units would need to be adjusted to reflect this change in size and role. The requirement for RAF helicopters would depend on whether it was
felt necessary to preserve a capability to move one company by air in two lifts, in which case we would need to retain current
numbers. The RN patrol craft are retained primarily for political
rather than defence reasons, with the full support of the Hong
Kong Government.
4. All this would reduce the overall size of the garrison to
about 2000-2500 military personnel compared with 6400 now. Such an approach invites some operational risk. It would prevent CBF
achieving his remit (CDS 44/88) or the BFHK concept of operations
which provides a viable counter to the current (December 1992)
threat assessment. In the event of a major internal
a major internal security
problem, it would not be possible, using in-theatre resources, to release the roughly 500 police tied up on border duties. This has to be seen against an overall police force size of around
26,000 however. The Chinese (who we would need to inform) may
regard such a step as a weakening of HMG's commitment to
preserving effective British sovereignty and internal security
in Hong Kong until 1997 and might consequently feel that in the
event of a major security crisis getting out of control they would be more justified in intervening. Chinese perceptions will
to some extent be conditioned by the general state of Sino-UK relations which, for a variety of reasons, are currently poor and are likely to remain volatile between now and 1997. It would be
possible to rely on reinforcement, but without identifying a
dedicated unit or group of units which would defeat the object of reducing overstretch it seems unlikely that we could have
significant forces on the ground in much less than seven days.
A delay of this magnitude might mean that a much larger force is
required. We would also be hampered by the fact that current
plans for the reinforcement of Hong Kong (JTP 30) have never been
exercised: our experiences over WINGED DRAGON indicate how
politically difficult this might be.
5.
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These risks relate to extreme circumstances which, although
they cannot be ruled out, are ones which all parties will be
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