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and international circles) support for and acceptance of military
decisions and the rationale behind them.
38. The PR/P Info Plan for the withdrawal of the Garrison should
continue to be reviewed and developed on a rolling basis. It should be
briefed to the Hong Kong Steering Committee at 6 monthly intervals. It
should take account of the handling of PR/P Info to 1997 and of the
PR/P Info organisation required to achieve this. The size and
seniority of PR/P Info staff should be kept under review. To ensure
continuity, changes to core PR manpower should cease after early 1995.
Issues that will undoubtedly attract media interest should continue to
be identified by MOD with HQBF Hong Kong, with suitable anticipatory
PR responses being prepared.
THE LAST 12 MONTHS AND SUPPORT FOR THE FINAL DEPARTURE
39. The 1991 Review included a brief discussion of BFHK in the Last
12 Months. It concluded that at least one battalion plus supporting
elements would be required until 30 June 1997, and that the final
withdrawal of these forces might require the support of a Naval Task
Force (NTF). As directed by COS, a Naval Working Group drew up a
paper for the Hong Kong Steering Committee (HKSC) on the possible
composition of a NTF to support the final withdrawal in 1997. The
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1991 Review Of The Options For The Composition Of The Naval Task Force To Assist In The Withdrawal From Hong Kong: A Paper By The Naval Staff, dated 13 Feb 92.
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