TNAG-2674-FCO40-3871-Hong-Kong-garrison-withdrawal-plan-1993 — Page 92

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SECRET UK EYES A

29. At present, BFHK has not experienced any significant increase in

resignations. It is assessed that staff are seeking to maximise their

eventual gratuity and that the enhanced redundancy package is proving

effective. This situation may change if employees perceive in the

future a need to distance themselves from the Garrison and to obtain

alternative employment prior to 1997. It is difficult to predict with

any certainty when or if this is likely to occur, but problems could

begin to manifest themselves from 1995. In that event it may prove

necessary to offer incentives in order to retain staff to the end.

30. Although recruitment of LECS has not yet proved to be a critical

problem, it is becoming increasingly difficult to attract the right

calibre of staff, particularly in the skilled grades. In the lower

grades, where absolute numbers are greater, relatively low levels of

pay may aggravate the situation.

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF BFHK

31.

Consequent upon a HQBF rationalisation study15 conducted in early

1992, CBF directed that HQ Support Troops was to be disbanded and that

some of the units previously under its command were to be grouped with

HQ 48 Gurkha Infantry Brigade: which became HQ 48 Gurkha Infantry

Brigade

and Hong Kong Garrison.

For operational

reasons and

administrative convenience, other Army units, such as QOGTR, were

15 HK 11751 J3 (0 and D)

dated 1992.

Ma

The HQ BFHK Rationalisation Study,

19

SECRET UK EYES A

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