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reception points
points for re-inforcement. Support units and RAF helicopter numbers would need to be adjusted to reflect this change in size and role. (The RN patrol craft are retained primarily for political rather than defence reasons, with the full support of the Hong Kong government, and their future is not considered further in this note.) Such an approach carries some
risk. In the event of a major internal security problem, it would
not be possible, using in theatre resources, to release the roughly 500 police tied up on border duties. This has to be seen against an overall police force size of around 26,000 however. The Chinese may regard such a step as abrogation on the part of HMG of its responsibilities for security in Hong Kong until 1997 and might consequently feel that in the event of a major security crisis they would be more justified in intervening. It would be possible to rely on re-inforcement, but without identifying a dedicated unit or group of units which would defeat the object of reducing overstretch it seems unlikely that we could have significant forces on the ground in much less than seven days. We would also be hampered by the fact that current plans for the re-inforcement of Hong Kong (JTP 30) have never been exercised:
our experiences over WINGED DRAGON indicate how politically difficult this might be.
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4. It is important not to overstate these risks however. They
relate to extreme circumstances which, although they cannot be ruled out, are ones which all parties will be anxious to avoid. From a political point of view, it seems likely that a more rapid
run-down of the garrison would be welcomed by the Hong Kong government and LEGCO for the financial savings that would result, though there may be some concern at what may be seen as a visible reduction in British commitment in Hong Kong, particularly if the withdrawal takes place at a time when relations with China are
strained.
5. In the UK the addition of a further infantry battalion to the emergency tour plot would be welcome [DMO: can we expand in light
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of latest developments on Bosnia? In particular, would it be more
useful to have it back earlier (ie in 1993) or later (1994) or
does it make no difference? Or don't we want it back at all?].
However, there are currently no barracks planned to be available,
though a major
a major deployment to Bosnia might throw up rattle accommodation. From an Army manning point of view the early
amalgamation of the two Gurkha battalions would cause significant
disruption. Of the two battalions due to be amalgamated only 2GR is currently in Hong Kong: 6GR is not due to arrive from Brunei
until July 1994 and starts the amalgamation process almost immediately thereafter. It is hard to see how this timetable
could be advanced significantly without a major alteration to the existing Gurkha arms plot and/or a change in the battalions to be amalgamated. This is likely to be detrimental to the morale
of the Brigade which is already relatively fragile. Resettlement
facilities in Nepal are also fully stretched and would be very
hard pressed to cope with an additional surge.
6. Politically, while it would be possible to represent any
easement of tour intervals positively, the fact that we have had
to pull a battalion out of
out of Hong Kong to do it could give
ammunition to those
those claiming that the Army continues to be
overstretched. Again, if this was done at a time of Sino-UK tension, the government might face charges of abandoning Hong
Kong.
Financial implications
7.
If we withdraw a UK battalion from Hong Kong, we will
immediately lose the 65% of its full costs that the Hong Kong
government meet under the DCA. This amounts to about fllm per year. Pulling out the battalion will lead to
lead to some savings in
support, eg the closure of Stanley Fort and some
educational
facilities and a reduction in logistic support, but to the extent
that the UK units and personnel affected are simply redeployed rather than disbanded a similar problem of lost receipts will
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apply. This would be offset by savings from Gurkha support units
and locally entered labour released earlier than planned, amounting to 35% of their full costs, though the up front costs of redundancy would need to be taken into account. Without a good deal of detailed work it is not possible to establish what the overall balance of these additional financial changes would be but they are very unlikely to offset the loss of receipts from the DCA of bringing a battalion back to the UK. In addition, there may be costs associated with finding accommodation for the
battalion: these could amount to as much as £21m.
8. From a Hong Kong government point of view however, this course of action would lead to major financial savings which they would embrace with open arms. It is also worth pointing out that the Hong Kong government may force us into major additional expenditure by simply refusing to pay their full share under the DCA and in effect cash limiting the size of the garrison or forcing the MOD to pick up the difference. Technically, they are already in breach of the DCA by not paying the full amount due for the 1992/3 fourth quarter payment and the desire to avoid more political trouble in LEGCO than is absolutely necessary may well lead them to conclude that they this is the least painful option. Given that the HKG have no reserve powers over LEGCO and
we have no realistic means of forcing them to pay, they are
probably right.
Conclusion
9. The operational arguments are not decisive. Reduction to one battalion in Hong Kong could lead to a small but unquantifiable increase in the risk of a major internal security problem there getting out of hand and/or the Chinese intervening. Bringing an extra battalion into the ETP would provide a modest amelioration of overstretch. It would probably make the Hong Kong government's
life easier in that it would remove a potential political problem at time when they have more than enough to deal with. On balance,
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