TNAG-2674-FCO40-3871-Hong-Kong-garrison-withdrawal-plan-1993 — Page 78

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some areas, and aggravated the already difficult relations (due primarily to problems with the Defence Lands issue and the new airport project) that existed between the UK and the People's Republic of

China (PRC). The role of the Garrison as the guardian of British Sovereignty, so contributing to confidence and stability in the Territory, should not be doubted; but its size, its activities, and the process of its withdrawal will nonetheless inevitably be subject

to close political and public scrutiny until 30 June 1997.

ASSESSMENT OF THE THREAT

concluded that the

5. The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)

stability of Hong Kong in the run-up to the handover to the PRC depends on the maintenance and political and commercial confidence in

the Territory. Hong Kong's sound economic performance and the ascendancy of

of economic reformers in Peking bode well for

for this.

However, the PRC leadership remains highly suspicious of British

policy, and their statements and actions, such as the hostile response

to the Governor's proposals for democratic reform, can (and often do)

damage confidence. The Chinese maintain the right to intervene if, in their view, Hong Kong appeared to be descending into chaos. They might also adopt this course if they judged that

judged that they would otherwise inherit a Territory dominated by independent and assertive groups (for

example, the United Democrats). However, they are

they are aware that such

action could affect their own economic interests adversely and

recourse to this would be as a last resort only. Accordingly, the JIC

has concluded that the threat of military intervention before the handover, while greater now than it was before the reform proposals,

นา

5

JIC (91) (N) 1 1991.

The Threat To Hong Kong, dated 10 January

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SECRET UK EYES A

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