TNAG-2674-FCO40-3871-Hong-Kong-garrison-withdrawal-plan-1993 — Page 60

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

the Garrison's overall size.

SECRET

UK EYES A

PTIONS FOR THE SIZE OF THE GARRISON

5.

It would be possible to dispense with maintaining a capacity to support the police in the IS role and leave the Garrison purely as a symbolic one. It is difficult to assess how large such a residual presence would be, but clearly it would be much smaller than now, probably amounting to little more than a small headquarters and a single infantry battalion group. Some elements might be retained because they, are of particular value to the Hong Kong Government, such as the RN patrol craft. The advantage of this approach would be that it would achieve the aim of cutting defence costs as fast as possible. The disadvantages are:

6.

a.

The practical difficulty and cost to HMG of actually carrying out a major and rapid rundown.

b. The possibility of Chinese hostility, given their preference for a strong British military presence to help maintain security in Hong Kong until 1997. It is possible that the lack of an in place military IS capability may make it more likely that the Chinese would exercise their oft stated right to intervene in Hong Kong before 1997 if they perceived that stability in the Territory were threatened.

c. The difficulty of restoring cuts once made, should the Hong Kong Government reverse its position as it did once before (post Tiananmen).

d. Any contingent operational capability would be totally dependent on reinforcement, with all the uncertainty regarding warning time and time needed for decision making that this implies.

e.

The risk of undermining confidence in Hong Kong by calling into question HMG's pre-1997 commitment. Early withdrawal of some three-quarters of the Garrison would give acute presentational difficulties.

The latest indications are that the Governor does not support such a drastic step, which leaves us looking at options for maintaining a militarily viable Garrison comprising the following key elements:

a.

Land. One infantry battalion to secure Garrison installations and key points, including the reinforcement airhead. A second battalion would be needed to provide a manoeuvre force capable of relieving the police on the border

or elsewhere.

b. Air. 6 Wessex aircraft to allow the airlift of one infantry company in 2 lifts within the Territory.

C.

Sea. There is no essential defence need for the 3 RN patrol craft, but there will be strong Hong Kong Government pressure to retain them till the end, whatever option is

COSSEC/S/2.004

3

UK EYES A

SECRET

Page 60Page 61

Comments

Approved members can add comments, bookmarks, and private notes.

No comments yet.

Private Research Note

Private notes are available after approval.