4.
SECRET
UK EYES A
Ultimately, leaving aside its symbolic value in demonstrating UK sovereignty, the Garrison provides recourse to a reliable British (as opposed to Hong Kong Government) controlled internal security capability for use in the last resort, if necessary with reinforcement, in the event of a major breakdown in law and order possibly coupled with a significant decline in the reliability and effectiveness of the police. It is primarily this requirement and the need to have sufficient forces on the ground to facilitate reinforcement that will drive the Garrison's overall size.
OPTIONS FOR THE SIZE OF THE GARRISON
5.
It would be possible to dispense with maintaining a capacity to support the police in the IS role and leave the Garrison purely as a symbolic one. It is difficult to assess how large such a residual presence would be, but clearly it would be much smaller than now, probably amounting to little more than a small
Some elements headquarters and a single infantry battalion group. might be retained because they are of particular value to the Hong
The advantage of Kong Government, such as the RN patrol craft. this approach would be that it would achieve what appears to be the current Hong Kong aim of cutting defence costs as fast as possible. The disadvantages are:
6.
The practical difficulty and cost to HMG of actually carrying out a major and rapid rundown.
a.
b.
The possibility of Chinese hostility, given their preference for a strong British military presence to help maintain security in Hong Kong until 1997. It is possible that the lack of an in place military IS capability may make it more likely that the Chinese would exercise their oft stated right to intervene in Hong Kong before 1997 if they perceived that stability in the Territory were threatened.
C. The difficulty of restoring cuts once made, should the Hong Kong Government reverse its position as it did once before (post Tiananmen).
d. Any contingent operational capability would be totally dependent on reinforcement, with all the uncertainty regarding warning time and time needed for decision making that this implies.
e.
The risk of undermining confidence in Hong Kong by calling into question HMG's pre-1997 commitment. Early withdrawal of some three-quarters of the Garrison would give acute presentational difficulties.
The latest indications are that the Governor does not support such a drastic step, which leaves us looking at options for maintaining a militarily viable Garrison comprising the following key elements:
a.
Land. One infantry battalion to secure Garrison installations and key points, including the reinforcement airhead. A second battalion would be needed to provide a
2
UK EYES A
SECRET
COSSEC/S/2.004
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