TNAG-2607-FCO40-3798-International-support-from-Japan-regarding-the-future-of-Hon-1992 — Page 7

B.E. TOKYO.

HKD 021/1

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WED 16 DEC 92 17:33

CONFIDENTIAL

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PG.01

49

Simon

SHERRINGTON.

HofC

ic.c.

Sir P. Callb

Mr. Hun

Mr. Buster, HRD

From: Date:

CC:

(ii) Mias Cillam

Tu, morning

Ambassador

15 December 1992

Minister

EC

FED (by fax)

Political Adviser,

Hong Kong (by fax)

br. Smistour. Smith Mr.M. Samies

м. ваше

4/12

CHINA/HONG KONG

1.

He was

A useful discussion with Yukio Satoh this morning. grateful for our recent input on China/Hong Kong. He had been struck by the close resemblance to the MFA's own thinking and drafting: they will show us their written thoughts soon.

The point about not stabbing the Governor of Hong Kong in the back is integral to the Japanese case. He is working closely with the China Division. As I have recorded elsewhere timing of submission of Japanese papers to the Clinton team is not yet settled.

2.

Yukio went on to pick out some strands in Japanese thinking. First, they were alert to an emotional/anti-Colonial element in China's approach to the world (a coded comment on Hong Kong, clearly). Second, they regarded the 14th Party Congress as a very significant development, producing clear endorsement of economic reform. Third, the Japanese regarded the human rights/economic nexus as particularly sensitive (comment: obviously!).

3.

At a more general level the Japanese sensed differences between the US and European approaches and wanted to stay in close touch with ours. He referred at this point (and the ironies are obvious) to American "emotionalism" on China.

4.

I took the opportunity of this exchange to brief Satoh in outline on the outcome of the Asian Working Group (FCO telno 982 to Peking). In answer to his question about the impact of Community views on our handling of Hong Kong I made it clear that HMG would never put EC political or economic requirements ahead of the interests of Hong Kong (particularly as defined by the Hong Kong electorate). But we kept our EC partners well briefed, expected them to speak up for Hong Kong (for which I could provide recent examples) and expected of course that Japan would continue to do likewise. The message to the Chinese, as Satoh knew, remained "cut the megaphones, cool it and address the proposals on the

table".

CONFIDENTIAL

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