TNAG-2606-FCO40-3797-International-support-from-Japan-regarding-the-future-of-Hon-1992 — Page 91

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YEAR BUT WAS SUFFERING FROM A LACK OF IMPORTED AND DOMESTIC FERTILISERS. WESTERN SUPPORT THROUGH THE G7 WAS VITAL. EARLY ENTRY TO THE IMF WAS ESSENTIAL. ONCE A PROGRAMME HAD BEEN AGREED G7 COUNTRIES SHOULD BE PREPARED TO AGREE TO A STABILISATION FUND.

9.

SAITO SAID THAT THE CIS AS A WHOLE WAS FACED BY SERIOUS PROBLEMS. IT HAD FAILED TO REACH AN AGREEMENT ON MILITARY DISPOSITIONS AND TRADE FLOWS BETWEEN THE REPUBLICS HAD BEEN INTERRUPTED. IT SEEMED LIKELY THAT THE CIS WOULD PLAY LESS AND LESS OF A ROLE, WITH INDIVIDUAL REPUBLICS BECOMING MORE INDEPENDENT. HE SAID THAT IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT YELTSIN WOULD BE FORCED TO STEP DOWN AS THERE WAS NO-ONE OBVIOUS TO REPLACE HIM. THE JAPANESE HAD ADMIRED HIS LIFTING OF PRICE RESTRICTIONS BUT FELT THAT THEY HAD NOT BEEN WELL PREPARED. DEVALUATION APPEARED TO HAVE HALTED BUT THE VALUE OF THE ROUBLE WAS ROCK BOTTOM AND SALARIES WERE LOW.

10. THE JAPANESE HOWEVER HAD A DILEMMA. WHILE IT WAS VITAL TO HELP YELTSIN IN HIS COMMITMENT TO REFORM, THE JAPANESE PEOPLE WOULD QUESTION LARGE-SCALE ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA UNTIL THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE WAS SOLVED OR THE JAPANESE HAD A VERY CLEAR ASSURANCE THAT IT WOULD BE SOLVED IN A REASONABLE TIMESCALE. SAITO SAID THAT HE REALISED THAT THE JAPANESE POSITION WOULD BECOME MORE DIFFICULT AS ECONOMIC REFORM IN THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUED AND OTHER G7 NATIONS DECIDED TO HELP. THEY WANTED THE G7 TO SEE THE RUSSIAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES AS A TEST OF THEIR WISH TO BECOME A RESPONSIBLE MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. ALTHOUGH YELTSIN DID NOT SEEM TO HAVE COME TO A DECISION YET, THE JAPANESE HOPED THAT HIS VISIT TO JAPAN IN SEPTEMBER WOULD FORCE HIM TO CONCENTRATE ON THE ISSUE.

11.

APPLEYARD SAID THAT WE BELIEVED THAT SENSIBLE ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN MADE FOR THE STRATEGIC FORCES OF THE FSU, BUT THAT THE ARMY REMAINED A SOURCE OF POSSIBLE TROUBLE. THE UKRAINE WAS CREATING ITS OWN ARMY AND THERE WOULD BE PRESSURE ON THE RUSSIANS TO FORM AN ARMY IN DUE COURSE. KAZAKHSTAN RETAINED ITS AMBIGUOUS POSITION ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE QUESTION OF THE BLACK SEA FLEET REMAINED A WORRY. WE NEEDED TO KEEP TELLING BOTH THE RUSSIANS AND, IN PARTICULAR, THE UKRAINEANS HOW MUCH IMPORTANCE WE ATTACHED TO THEM SOLVING THEIR DIFFICULTIES PEACEFULLY.

12. ON THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES, APPLEYARD SAID THAT WE WANTED TO SEE A SOLUTION WHICH WAS SATISFACTORY TO THE JAPANESE. WE HAD

RAISED THE MATTER OFTEN WITH THE SOVIETS AND THE RUSSIAN

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