CONFIDENTIAL
004364
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MDLIAN
6.
SINCE THEN THE POLICY HAS BEEN FOLLOWED, AND OVER THE YEARS OPERATORS HAVE BEEN COMPLYING WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF OBTAINING
PRC PERMISSION. FROM AN AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL OPERATION POINT OF VIEW, NO PROBLEM HAS BEEN ENCOUNTERED IN HANDLING THESE FLIGHTS TO MACAU.
7.
CONTINUING THE PRESENT POLICY OF REQUIRING HONG KONG CARRIERS TO OBTAIN SUCH PERMISSION FROM THE PRC (NEXT WORD UNDERLINED) BEFORE WE APPROVE FLIGHTS TO MACAU PUTS US IN THE
POSITION OF HAVING TO APPLY DOUBLE STANDARDS. COMMERCIAL SERVICES NOW CROSS PRC TERRITORY TO OTHER DESTINATIONS IN LARGE NUMBERS EN ROUTE TO AND FROM HONG KONG WITHOUT THIS REQUIREMENT.
8. WE HAVE ALSO BORNE IN MIND THE FACT THAT ALTHOUGH THE PRC
ARE NOT SIGNATORIES TO THE INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES TRANSIT AGREEMENT (IASTA) THEY ARE SIGNATORIES TO THE CHICAGO CONVENTION WHICH INCLUDES AT ARTICLE 5 A PRESUMPTION OF PERMISSION FOR NON- SCHEDULED FLIGHT FOR NON-TRAFFIC PURPOSES. IN 1971 WHEN THE ORIGINAL FCO ADVICE WAS ISSUED THE PRC WAS NOT A MEMBER OF ICAO (ACCORDING TO SHAWCROSS AND BEAUMONT THE PRC ''DECIDED TO
RECOGNISE THE CONVENTION'' IN A LETTER DATED 15 FEBRUARY 1974 TO ICAO) AND WE PRESUME THAT IN 1971 THE CHINA SEAT WOULD HAVE BEEN OCCUPIED BY TAIWAN.
9.
UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IT WOULD SEEM THAT THE ADVICE CONTAINED IN THE FCO LETTER REFERRED TO ABOVE HAS BEEN SUPERSEDED BY EVENTS AND IT WOULD BE REASONABLE TO PUT FLIGHT TO MACAU ON A MORE ORTHODOX FOOTING. WE PROPOSE THEREFORE THAT WE BE PREPARED TO ISSUE THE PERMIT AND (NEXT WORD UNDERLINED) SUBSEQUENTLY THE OPERATOR MAY SEEK CLEARANCE FROM THE AUTHORITIES FOR OVERFLIGHT PERMISSION IN HIS OWN TIME. THESE APPROVAL SHOULD NO LONGER BE A PREREQUISITE FOR THE ISSUE OF A PERMIT IN HONG KONG ALTHOUGH THE NEED FOR SUCH APPROVAL WOULD BE CLEARLY INDICATED.
10. BEFORE TAKING THIS COURSE OF ACTION FURTHER WE WOULD INFORM THE PRC AUTHORITIES OF OUR PLANS. WE WOULD WELCOME YOUR ADVICE.
FORD
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