BACKGROUND
CONFIDENTIAL
A
3.
The Secretary of State approved a revision of our guidelines on defence equipment sales to Taiwan shortly before the Election.
Nothing has since changed to require any fundamental revision of the
policy so soon afterwards. The main substantive change over previous policy was to expand the scope for use of third country channels for sale of technology and parts. There is a provision for approval of dual-use equipment when the end-user is civilian.
The
guidelines (like any such licensing arrangement) inevitably leave a
large grey
area where we need to ex erci se our di scretion. We have
such a case now, involving airfield damage repair equipment.
4.
The initial application for export of this equipment was made on 30 January this year by Moral Consultants, a consultancy firm
acting on behalf of a group of companies. It was made in the form
of an Arms Working Party Application (AWP). Approval of an AWP lets
the applicant know that an Export Licence for his product would
probably be granted if one were applied for, but does not commit HMG
to granting an Export Licence.
5.
The equipment is designed primarily to allow the rapid repair of runways damaged by bombs, thereby allowing aircraft to take off
from and land on them. Bomb craters are filled with rubble and
cement, which is then compacted down, and are then covered with tensioned steel matting. The equipment is destined for a military
end-user,
the Taiwan Air Force.
6.
Taiwan are
by Ministers
basis that it
Applications to FED for approval of exports to
considered under the terms of the guidelines approved
on 5 March 1992. This application was refused on the would enhance the capability of the Taiwan Armed Forces,
therefore contravened our guidelines.
and
CONFIDENTIAL
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