Hkc 012/4
HKC
Confolentionl
Personal
55
се
୮
faller
знат
Mr Hum
It was apparent thing the Caverness's visil Hal
FROM: P F Ricketts
Hong Kong Department
DATE: 13 November 1992
cc: Mr Davies, FED
Mr Wye, RAD Mr Bunten
he is aware of Hese wider problems
Miss Saunders
par
¿241~
HONG KONG : CENTRAL POLICY UNIT PAPER ON POSSIBLE CHINESE MEASURES AGAINST HONG KONG
1.
I attach a paper which I have just received in the bag from Hong Kong. As you will see, it is a CPU assessment of a "worst case scenario".
2.
I find this an inadequate and rather worrying paper. It claims to consider the "entire spectrum of counter measures open to the CPG". And it concludes that "HKG can cope with even the worst case scenario". But the paper does not in fact cover the entire spectrum of possibilities. It gets distracted into second-order bureaucratic issues and makes what seem to me to be some rather heroic assumptions about the robustness of support within the Hong Kong community (see for example para 20b and in particular para 26b).
The paper underestimates in my view the risks that the Chinese will be able to disrupt the 1995 elections, and does not consider at all some of the measures suggested by Sir R McLaren (for example the massive increase in illegal emigration, aggressive patrolling around Hong Kong's borders etc).
3. I think that the nett effect is to underplay the seriousness of the confrontation we face and the risks for
Hong Kong. If the Governor is basing his judgements on papers of this kind, the risks of miscalculation are obvious.
Lobel
P F Ricketts
Dr. Am 2) Mr. Michalt
-257
}
but in the ovent
agree
کمیلی آنك
Ī
ith
No Ricketts. The
love not, Lo
starke, arsen the abbest 1
would not divems with the forener.
cpu. FUTURE.kr
Bolu coles 23.
oth and watining freege
JLG Lusweino
a systematic refusal to do bussion with the Govenor
really laterish Churèse attempté to subling the
1995 election.
2. In may wish to mention to the Govenor. Otm's lin
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.