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CONF. ENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
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ELNO 1558
CF 051005Z NOVEMBER 92
INFO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG, UKREP JLG HONG KONG
PERSONAL FOR RICKETTS, HKD, FROM AMBASSADOR
-ONG KONG PERSONAL FOR POLITICAL ADVISER
JKREP JLG PERSONAL FOR GALSWORTHY
YOUR FAXED LETTER OF 4 NOVEMBER TO EHRMAN: HONG KONG: PAPER FOR OPD(K)
PR Clear Capry
I AGREE THAT MINISTERS SHOULD BE GIVEN A REALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLICATIONS FOR HONG KONG OF THE PRESENT CHINESE APPROACH. I AM NOT SURE THAT YOUR PAPER DOES SO IN SUFFICIENTLY STARK TERMS.
2. THE DRAFT IDENTIFIES THE CRUCIAL ISSUE AS BEING WHETHER SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNOR'S PACKAGE WILL HOLD UP IN HONG KONG IN THE FACE OF THE CHINESE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN. I THINK YOU SHOULD BRING OUT THE FACT THAT WE CANNOT EXPECT THIS CAMPAIGN TO CEASE WITH THE PASSAGE OF LEGISLATION (ASSUMING THAT LEGCO AGREE TO THE PROPOSALS IN THEIR PRESENT FORM). THE CAMPAIGN IS LIKELY TO BE SUSTAINED AND INTENSIFIED OVER THE FOLLOWING TWO YEARS. THE QUESTION IS THUS NOT ONLY WHETHER LEGCO WILL PASS LEGISLATION TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE GOVERNOR'S PROPOSALS BUT ALSO WHETHER PUBLIC OPINION WILL SUPPORT THE HOLDING OF ELECTIONS IN 1995 ON A BASIS NOT AGREED WITH THE CHINESE.
3. THIS RAISES THE UNDERLYING ISSUE OF THE KIND OF RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA OVER HONG KONG WE WISH TO MAINTAIN OVER THE NEXT FOUR AND A HALF YEARS, AT THE END OF WHICH WE ARE BOUND BY THE JOINT DECLARATION TO RETURN THE TERRITORY TO CHINA. CLEARLY WE DO NOT WANT COOPERATION ON ANY TERMS THE CHINESE CARE TO STATE, BUT THERE ARE MAJOR DISADVANTAGES IN A WHOLLY ADVERSARIAL RELATIONSHIP. IT IS TRUE THAT IF WE HAVE CONFRONTATION IT WILL BE BY CHINESE CHOICE NOT OURS, BUT WE NEED TO CONSIDER THE IMPLICATIONS.
L THE DRAFT IMPLIES (PARA 9) THAT THE CHANCES OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON ACCEPTABLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE 1995 ELECTIONS ARE SO REMOTE THAT WE SHOULD NOT OURSELVES MAKE ANY REAL EFFORT. GIVEN THE RISKS INVOLVED IN GOING IT ALONE, WHICH THE DRAFT APPEARS TO ACCEPT AS INEVITABLE, WOULD THERE NOT BE ADVANTAGE IN AT LEAST EXPLORING WHETHER THERE COULD BE SOME BASIS FOR AGREEMENT ? AT TH MOMENT, OF COURSE, THE CHINESE ARE UNWILLING TO TALK, AND THEY MIGHT INSIST ON UNACCEPTABLE PRECONDITIONS BEFORE DOING SO. SHOULD OURSELVES BE CONSIDERING POSSIBLE WAYS OF GETTING THEM TO THE TABLE.
5. THE FINAL PARAGRAPH DOES NOT SEEM TO ME TO OFFER VERY MUCH IN THE WAY OF IDEAS ABOUT THE WAY FORWARD. THE THIRD SENTENCE ('ONCE THE CHINESE HAVE REALISED . .') STRIKES ME AS WISHFUL THINKING. I KNOW OF NO EVIDENCE FOR IT.
6.
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I DO NOT HAVE TIME TO PUT FORWARD DRAFTING LANGUAGE TO TAKE
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