TNAG-2487-FCO40-3618-Future-relations-between-Hong-Kong-and-China-1992 — Page 81

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reactions of the Chinese and the British to them. For their part

any delay in implementing or any backtracking from the principles

of full representative democracy are portrayed as a betrayal by

the British and as evidence of their kowtowing to the Communist

Chinese authorities. Their leaders Martin Lee and Szeto Wah had

been prominent in giving material support to the demonstrators

in Tiananmen Square in the Spring of 1989 and they had assisted

some of the dissidents in escaping after the crackdown of June

4th. The Chinese authorities have since denounced them as

subversives. Such is the fear of the Chinese authorities that

they introduced into the subsequent draft of their Basic Law for

the territory a special clause outlawing subversion of the

mainland. Although they were no lovers of Western democracy

before June 1989, the first draft of the Basic Law (that in other

respects was more restrictive) did not have that clause. In the

first direct elections to the Legislative Council held in 1991

the UDHK won 16 of the 18 seats (out of a total of 60 in the

council) and Beijing supported candidates did not win a single

seat. That result did not endear the democratic process to the

Chinese authorities and as we shall see it has raised new

problems for the British side especially in preparing for the

1995 elections which will be the last before the transfer of

sovereignty.

From the perspective of the British negotiators and the Hong

Kong Government who are responsible for maintaining "stability

and prosperity" in the territory up to 30 June 1997 and who have

every interest in trying to effect a smooth transition of