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coordinated new British strategy in late May 1992 when firstly,
the newly appointed designate governor, Chris Patten, stated at
his first press conference that he wanted freedom as well as
stability and prosperity for Hong Kong; secondly, the British
Minister with responsibility for the territory (who had also just
been appointed to the job) stated publicly on his first visit to
the island that the only obstacle to amending The Basic Law (the
mini-constitution for the future that had been promulgated by the
Chinese in 1990) was political; and thirdly that John Major was
photographed with Martin Lee (the prominent Hong Kong politician
regarded as a subversive by Beijing) outside No.10 Downing
Street. A senior Chinese researcher explained that there is a
fear in the Chinese government that Britain could "cause trouble"
by encouraging Hong Kong to become "too independent"; that Hong
Kong could become "too strong" with "too many independent
institutions".
Such views not only attest to the long standing tendency
to subscribe to the conspiracy view of history when dealing with
an adversary, but they militate against taking into account the
bureaucratic and personal problems that the other side may have.
Which, as will be suggested below, have been quite serious in
both cases.
(4) Since much has already been written on the negotiating
style of the Chinese Communists and how this reflects cultural
7
Notes from a discussion with of West European Studies of the Sciences 3/8/92.
researchers of the Institute Chinese Academy of Social
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