TNAG-2487-FCO40-3618-Future-relations-between-Hong-Kong-and-China-1992 — Page 70

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been achieved to date. But it should be recalled that what made

the British side retreat in 1983 from its initial negotiating

position of recognising Chinese sovereignty in return for British

administration was the realisation in the middle of a crisis of

confidence in Hong Kong which saw a rapid depreciation of the

currency and a dramatic fall in the value of shares that Deng

Xiaoping was absolutely serious in declaring that he was So

determined to regain full sovereignty that he would be prepared

to see Hong Kong ruined if necessary in order to achieve that.

Even now that he can have even less interest in allowing Hong

Kong to be ruined as the price for regaining sovereignty, there

can be no certainty that he would not still hold to his 1983

position. The exigencies for political survival in the corridors

of power in Beijing that no leader can afford to appear soft on

the sovereignty issue and expect to survive or to avoid

vilification by future historians.

The principal purpose of this article is to identify the

main difficulties in the negotiations with a view to contributing

to understanding one of the most important foreign policy

questions for which Britain alone is responsible. The concern

here is less with the substance of the negotiations than with

their conduct. In particular three broad issue areas may be

isolated for discussion: (1) Do any of the two sides

misunderstand or misperceive the purposes or interests of the

other? Do the differences in culture and politics create

obstacles to cooperation? Do their different approaches to

rise impediments? (2) Does the way the

negotiations give rise

give

to