TNAG-2473-FCO40-3600-Asian-Development-Bank-liabilities-of-Hong-Kong-1992 — Page 89

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 734

OF 030009Z APRIL 92

CONFIDENTIAL

нив 102/0

AMENDED DISTRIBUTION 3/4

рс

Zo

053037

MDLIAN 6594

Asia Dov-Bunk

MAm2/4

INFO PRIORITY SEOUL, PEKING, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKMIS VIENNA, TOKYO INFO ROUTINE EC POSTS, ACTOR

YOUR TELNO 388: CONTACTS WITH NORTH KOREA

SUMMARY

1.

AMERICANS CONTENT WITH OUR APPROACH. GRATEFUL FOR OUR WILLINGNESS TO DELAY OUR FINAL RESPONSE TO NORTH KOREA UNTIL AFTER SUPREME PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY. WELCOME OUR ASSURANCE THAT WE WOULD USE A MEETING TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE ON THE NORTH.

DETAIL

2.

ON 2 APRIL WE SPOKE TO STATE AS INSTRUCTED IN TUR, LEAVING A SPEAKING NOTE WITH KARTMANN (DIRECTOR, KOREAN OFFICE) ON LINES OF PARA 2.

3.

-

HE

KARTMANN SAID HE WAS CONTENT WITH OUR PROPOSED APPROACH. WAS PARTICULARLY GRATEFUL FOR OUR DECISION TO DELAY GIVING A DEFINITE RESPONSE TO THE NORTH KOREANS UNTIL AFTER THE NORTH KOREAN SUPREME PEOPLES ASSEMBLY. LINKING OUR DECISION IN PART ΤΟ EARLY RATIFICATION OF THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WAS HELPFUL. IT WAS RIGHT TO OFFER THE NORTH KOREANS A CARROT. HE SAID HE EXPECTED THE NORTH KOREANS TO RATIFY THE AGREEMENT: IT WOULD CAUSE THEM MORE TROUBLE THAN IT WAS WORTH TO FALTER AT THIS STAGE. HE WELCOMED OUR ASSURANCE THAT WE WOULD USE A MEETING TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE IN THE NORTH.

4. WE ASKED ABOUT AMERICAN ATTITUDES TO NORTH KOREA'S OBSERVER STATUS AT THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB) (PARA ONE OF TUR). KARTMANN EXPLAINED THAT THE AMERICANS SUSPECTED THAT THE NORTH KOREANS WERE TRYING TO OBTAIN THE BENEFITS OF RATIFICATION BEFORE THEY HAD ACTUALLY EARNED THEM. THEY HAD RECENTLY MADE A NUMBER OF OVERTURES TO VARIOUS COUNTRIES (HE MENTIONED BRAZIL, PHILIPPINES, AND MEXICO) IN THE HOPE OF EXPANDING THEIR TRADE. THE AMERICANS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IT WOULD SOON BECOME IMPOSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN THE * CURRENT ISOLATION OF NORTH KOREA, BUT THEY WERE ANXIOUS NOT TO GIVE

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