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difficulties we face in clearing with the Chinese a viable progress towards the 1995 elections, whose results will be respected by the Chinese after 1997. But as long as we continue to convince our Whitehall colleagues that we have a viable strategy, I think that the Treasury and others will be prepared
to support us. Recent discussions about banking matters do, however, mean that there is a much greater awareness of the problems of Hong Kong than hitherto amongst the other Departments, particularly the Treasury. Although this produces the slightly rebarbative comments which you may have felt in recent telegrams, it also produces an opportunity for us to face up to some of the economic and financial anxieties that are felt at this end, and, by finding a solution to them, helping to
confirm Whitehall-wide support for our present tactics.
8. If, however, we see the election of a Labour Administration,
then both we and the Chinese will have to give the new
Government time to address the issues and decide whether the
present strategy is one which they wish to pursue. I cannot predict the outcome, although I doubt whether the policy would
be radically changed. But I do fear that the Chinese will be
even less ready to strike deals with us than they are now,
unless and until they feel that they have reached a political understanding with the new Government that the understandings
reached with Mrs Thatcher and Mr Major will prevail.
9. It is against this background and in the ready acknowledgement that it is much easier to discuss these issues face to face than by correspondence, that we have proposed the
Low key visitation in our telno 746 The issues we want to
·
discuss are financial economic but with strong political
content. What we need to do is to peer far enough into the
future that we can give new Ministers on 10 April a reasonable
picture
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