TNAG-2469-FCO40-3593-Most-favoured-nation-status-for-China-Hong-Kong-interests-1992 — Page 62

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON

TO TELELETTER FCO

TELELETTER NFR

OF 030035Z DECEMBER 92

CONFIDENTIAL

MWB 011/2

AND TO TELELETTER HONG KONG, PEKING

FROM: S D PATTISON, WASHINGTON

Mr.

MFN 133

131745

MDTTAN 2154

Whitney b see I've replied

TO:

P RICKETTS ESQ, HONG KONG DEPARTMENT, FCO

CC:

S BRADLEY ESQ, DEPUTY POLITICAL ADVISER, HONG KONG

CHANCERY PEKING

U.S./HONG KONG

412

1. WHEN I CALLED ON BOB FITZ (PRIVATE SECRETARY TO WILLIAM CLARKE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIA, STATE) THE OTHER DAY, HE SAID

THAT HE HAD BEEN SURPRISED TO SEE IN A REPORT FROM THE U.S.

EMBASSY IN LONDON THAT GOVERNOR PATTEN HAD BEEN TALKING ABOUT TRYING TO USE MFN AS A LEVER ON THE CHINESE. THE GOVERNOR'S IDEA

SEEMED TO BE TO CONDITION MFN ON CHINESE COOPERATION OVER HONG

KONG. FITZ SAID HE THOUGHT THE GOVERNOR INTENDED TO FLOAT THIS

WITH U.S. CONGRESSMEN DURING HIS VISIT IN FEBRUARY.

2.

FITZ SAID STATE THOUGHT THIS WAS A VERY BAD IDEA. HE WONDERED

WHETHER IT HAD BEEN FULLY THOUGHT THROUGH. IT WOULD BE VERY

DANGEROUS TO FLOAT SUCH AN IDEA WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS. SOME WOULD NO DOUBT BE ATTRACTED TO IT. BUT ONCE WE CONCEDED THE

PRINCIPLE THAT MFN SHOULD BE CONDITIONAL ON ANY IMPROVEMENT IN CHINESE BEHAVIOUR, IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO STOP CONGRESS ATTACHING ALL SORTS OF OTHER CONDITIONS. SIMILAR POINTS WERE MADE

TO ME SEPARATELY BY THE HONG KONG DESK OFFICER AT STATE.

STATE ALSO TOLD ME THAT THEY HAD PREPARED A PAPER FOR THE

CLINTON TRANSITION TEAM ON HONG KONG. THIS MADE CLEAR THAT MEN WAS ESSENTIAL TO MAINTAINING HONG KONG'S PROSPERITY.

3.

4. STATE ADDED THAT THEY WERE INCREASINGLY WORRIED ABOUT THE

GROWING TENSION BETWEEN HONG KONG AND PEKING. PEKING'S RECENT STATEMENT THAT THEY WOULD NOT HONOUR POST-1997 CONTRACTS WAS

TROUBLING. NO-ONE HAD FORESEEN THAT THE CHINESE WOULD REACT TO THE

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CONFIDENTIAL