TNAG-2469-FCO40-3593-Most-favoured-nation-status-for-China-Hong-Kong-interests-1992 — Page 139

Ms Life o.r

bin

oulz

Ma Richetts

Dara to on

on NAMI

view of likely exly

introduction of legislaties.

CA

th. Whitney 1911

MFN not unexpected but still worrying. Link!

anth

M. Marmi (19/0

рам para.

6.

seppent fou

FROM: A Vinall

I-ce Mak I DATE:

FED)'

Mr fanges, HKD

2. M. afford

cc:

para 6

3. pa EZIUS Trande

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS

нні

(117)

Position

the MAM at least.!

29 October 1992

Minister (TP)

R Allen,

ITP, DTI

J Hagestadt, OT2, DTI A Smith ECD(E), FCO ✓ R Saunders, Economic S Pattison, Chancery

Hi

1. Minister (TP) and I called on Jerry Jasinowski (President) and Howard Lewis (VP, International Economic Affairs) of the NAM for a general discussion of international trade issues.

2. Jasinowski said that Clinton largely remained an unknown quantity as far as international affairs were concerned. One of his aides had admitted that it was an area he knew relatively little about. NAM had been lobbying successfully to get him to stress the importance of exports for economic growth in his speeches. But they were concerned that he would be less able than Bush to resist protectionist pressures in Congress. With the exception of a few Senators (such as Rockefeller, or Sarbanes on exports) most members of Congress had unsophisticated views on international trade, and there would be many new and inexperienced members in the next Congress.

2. When Mr Marsden mentioned our current efforts to keep alive the Uruguay Round negotiations, Jasinowski's immediate reaction was that the Round was dead and that most people had lost interest in it: he was interested to know why we thought there might be signs of life. The NAM's position was to support the Round, but many members were increasingly vocal in their concerns that the Dunkel text would weaken. US trade law (the semi-conductor industry had recently made this point). Whereas the business community was united in supporting NAFTA, they were divided on the Round. Arguments about adverse effects on US trade law would register heavily in Congress. Significant portions of US industry might be happy to see the Round fail.

-

-

4. Jasinowski feared that a majority of Clinton's likely advisers might tell him that the Uruguay Round was no longer important. The impasse in the EC/US agriculture negotiations was prompting some talk of a "restructured Round" (there is a paper by Geoff Lang, a former aid to Senator Bentsen, now inevitably working for a Washington law firm on this: maybe we could try to get a copy). Jasinowski was not however clear about what restructuring meant. It could either be a re-launch of the Round to include new areas of concern, particularly the environment (a sure recipe for disaster) or an approach under which the US decided to take what was on the table, recognising that while it fell short of their ideal solution, it nonetheless met many of their original negotiating goals. On the whole, Jasinowski would be inclined to tell Clinton that he should "take the money and run" if elected.

Ate