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could draw The Queen into a constitutional crisis.
9.
We are therefore left with the Governor's two other
options, or variants on them.
These are:
i) For the Governor to refuse his assent to such a Bill under his existing powers in Article X of the LP (Option D). A variant on this, not spelled out by the Governor, would be for him to reserve such a Bill for decision in London also
using Article X.
ii) To amend the LP so that the Governor would be obliged to reserve for decision in London any Bill seeking to alter LegCo's constitution and procedures (Option B). A variant on this (which is the Option preferred by the Governor) would be to prepare such an amendment to the LP but not put the necessary Order in Council through unless an actual problem arose in Hong Kong.
10. The pros and cons of these Options are as follows:
Option D: relying on existing powers. This would not involve running the political risk of taking new reserve powers for the purpose (as it would be seen in Hong Kong) of frustrating the will of elected representatives. It would put LegCo in the position of forcing us to take out of the cupboard powers which have long remained dormant. That said, using these powers would be attacked in Hong Kong and the UK as anti-democratic. It would be particularly unfortunate if a new Governor was put in a position of having to refuse his assent to a Bill passed by LegCo early in his term. Refusal of assent to a LegCo Bill would also set a bad precedent for the future Chief Executive (who also has this power). The impact on the Governor's position might be reduced if he opted instead to use his existing
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