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Reference..
(f) Para 11: again we have "the choice between continuity and more democracy" with which you want to face Hong Kong
opinion more squarely. (This also raises the question of
6zl Seled cfte; how Hong Kong opinion could express itself once it makes
Matre defaler?
a
Press
little tendentious?
Норе бо
the choice in the 1995 LegCo elections?)
(g) Para 16: "hence": it is a big leap from accepting the
2.
principle of maximum continuity in the Civil Service to accepting that the Chinese should impose their own candidate as Chief Executive and dictate his choice of Principal Officials.
On substance my only comment is that in listing issues for discussion on the political scene (para 9), a key question is whether the policies which HKG and Peking are separately pursuing will, if continued, succeed in marginalising Mr Martin Lee and the other most irksome liberals at the 1995 LegCo elections or before.
3
If indeed our objective in 1995 is a more conciliatory LegCo, ie one which opts for maximum continuity on Peking's terms,
one approach might be for us to take a much tougher line with Peking now: the conventional wisdom is that once the Sino-British waters get choppy Hong Kong opinion swings in favour of a quiet life with Peking. A change of Government policy in 1995 would be politcally easy to justify if it were a clear response to the election of a more accommodating LegCo.
4. I suspect that Ministers may recoil from giving more of a say to Hong Kong people because of the Falklands and Gibraltar precedents, but the situations are quite different.
5. In any case we will no doubt approach the 1995 elections (or any anticipated elections - on which I remain keen) with a clearer strategy than the 1991 elections.
CODE 18-77
Max.
N J Cox
10 February 1992
NC2ABK
CONFIDENTIAL
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