CONFIDENTIAL
On the question of when to approach the Chinese about increasing the number of directly-elected seats on LegCo, it was agreed that now was not the right time. Nevertheless, the Secretary of State proposed to tell the Prime Minister that Cabinet would need to take a decision around the end of this year. The Secretary of State identified two options: either we could put a proposal to the Chinese having decided on our own minds that our top priority was to preserve the through-train; or we could increase the number of directly-elected seats in 1995 despite Chinese objections. The Secretary of State noted Mr Cox's point that it was not necessary to wait until September 1995 to h old the next LegCo elections: they could be earlier. some degree a final
decision would depend on what was happening in China at the time. But the Secretary of State saw some attraction in facing down the Chinese, not least because our political ground would be strong. In the meantime, we must not give any points away.
The Secretary of State was interested by your suggestion that one way of improving the democratic composition of LegCo without demanding more directly-elected seats would be to arrange for the functional constituencies to have a wider franchise. This would not require amendment to the Basic Law. The meeting also noted that the question of who would sit on the "Election Committee" had not been addressed. The Secretary of State also noted that there were other difficult issues, such as the voting age and the limit on the percentage of non-Chinese nationals on LegCo which would need to be discussed with the Chinese.
Finally, Lord Caithness mentioned that the Chinese maintained that Martin Lee could not be accepted on the through-train. The Secretary of State said he did not see how we could accept this. It was reasonable that LegCo members should be asked to take an oath of loyalty to the SARG, but not that they should be subjected to a test of political acceptability.
First Chief Executive and Principal Officials for the SARG
The Secretary of State accepted the argument that there was a strong case for trying to pre-cook these issues with the Chinese, although the time was not yet ripe. So far as the Chief Executive was concerned, the Secretary of State thought that we should try to resurface this autumn the arrangements which we discussed with the Chinese before Tiananmen Square: ie that the Chief Executive-designate would spend some time working alongside the Governor (but not as part of the Administration) in order to prepare to take on the position himself. The meeting accepted that it was in our interest to
CONFIDENTIAL
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