PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
We discussed other options for building up the democratic credentials of the 1995 LegCo without falling foul of the Basic Law. The Secretary of State was interested by the possibility of expanding the franchise for some of the functional constituencies. He also noted that there could be scope to build up the "Election Committee" (which is to elect 10 members) into a sizeable electoral body.
The Secretary of State recognised that a number of the convergence issues, such as the BL stipulation that no more than 20% of the through train LegCo could be made up of non-Chinese nationals, or those with the right of abode overseas, presented enormous problems. He was inclined to agree that we would need to put the onus on the Chinese to explain how a smooth transition could be achieved in this case. He also hoisted in the problems over Chinese opposition to lowering the voting age and to the electoral and boundary commission. Some interest was also expressed at the meeting in the voting system which would be used in 1994/95. I think Ministers would like a chance to comment on that before decisions are set in concrete at your end.
We also touched on the Chinese contention that Martin Lee could not ride the through train. The Secretary of State accepted that it was reasonable to expect LegCo members to take an oath of alligiance to the SARG but he found it quite unacceptable that they should be subjected to a separate political test as to whether they met the requirements set out in the Basic Law.
First Chief Executive and Principal Officials
We set out the advantages in terms of continuity of resuming the pre-Tiananmen discussions with the Chinese on selection of the first Chief Executive, and of carrying forward the discussions launched during the visit of Chen Ziying and Lu Ping to Hong Kong over recent months on Principal Officials. The Secretary of State accepted the need for this. So far as the Chief Executive was concerned, he thought that it would be in our interests to try discreetly to agree with the Chinese in advance the identity of the CE, and to arrange that he should spend some time as Chief Executive-designate working alongside the administration on the model of a President-elect in the US. He thought that the right time to resume the discussions broken off in 1989 would be towards the end of this year. Principal Officials, he also accepted that it was right to resume discreet discussions with the Chinese in due course. Given the sensitivities in Hong Kong, it would be better if this was done as far as possible between the Governor and Chinese representatives in Hong Kong rather than involving London and Peking. He accepted that this issue should not be played too long, given the signs that the Chinese were developing their own thinking about the transition. agreed to put down a marker about Transitional Affairs' Advisers with Qian in March.
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PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
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