TNAG-2452-FCO40-3569-Future-of-Hong-Kong-constitutional-development-1992 — Page 149

CONFIDENTIAL

I proposed at the end of my Memorandum a number of broad

conclusions:

-

Firm support for the Governor.

Crucial that the Chinese

should see that there is no scope for wedge-driving. We can also support his approach in other ways; by continuing to encourage the Chinese to engage in a calm discussion; by stiffening spines in the business community here and keeping

Parliament on side: by keeping the Clinton Administration and

other natural supporters briefed (the old Commonwealth, Japan,

the EC).

-

Giving the Governor discretion to amend his proposals if

necessary.

Would be premature now. But in the logic of

describing these as "proposals" to be willing to change if this becomes necessary to buttress support in Legco by showing

that we are responsive to Hong Kong opinion and that this was not a fait accompli.

Very little prospect of reaching agreement with China on

terms acceptable to us. But we do have an obligation under

the Joint Declaration to continue dialogue with China. If

there are changes the Governor judges should be made either

before or during passage of the legislation in LegCo, value in

putting these to the Chinese privately. Aim would be to re-engage them in a discussion, and possibly to mute their eventual opposition to the package.

-

Would not want to take the initiative in proposing an earlier meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister than currently planned (Easter recess). Could send wrong signals in Hong

Kong and here. But if Qian were to propose one, hard to

refuse. Suggest consider again nearer the time of the

Governor putting proposals to LegCo: might then be tactically

ptm.OPD 18Nov.PETER

JEB

CONFIDENTIAL