SECRET
12. It is hard to predict the Chinese reaction to the Governor's package. They will almost certainly take a hostile line at first. If it becomes necessary to go ahead without their agreement, the Chinese might (at best) reserve their position, while waiting to see how LegCo operated in practice between 1995 and 1997. At worst, they could say that no-one elected in 1995 would be allowed to serve on LegCo from 1997, and/or start to make public preparations for electing a new LegCo in 1997. That would be unsettling in Hong Kong.
13. Whatever the final outcome, we are likely to face several months of difficult discussions accompanied by a Chinese
That might further delay agreement on propaganda offensive. the airport, although Chinese efforts to link the airport to political developments have not gone down well in Hong Kong, and there are recent signs that they may be re-thinking their approach. So we may still be able to get the airport agreed while discussing the constitutional points with China.
14. I plan to give the Chinese Foreign Minister a broad outline of the proposals when I see him in New York on 25 September. The Governor will be going to Peking shortly after his LegCo address in order to explain his ideas in person to the Chinese leadership.
15.
My conclusion is that the Governor's proposals represent They a skilful balance in the face of conflicting pressures. provide a robust basis on which to press ahead with democratic development in Hong Kong in a way which does not cut across the Basic Law. I support his approach.
SECRET
Page 45Page 46
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.