TNAG-2450-FCO40-3567-Future-of-Hong-Kong-constitutional-development-1992 — Page 11

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committing them to confrontation with us and the Governor.

They would be unlikely to have much support in Hong Kong and

there would certainly be an unsettling effect there. It is

hard to see us reaching agreement on the airport in these

circumstances.

Alternatively, the Chinese could decide to take a less

confrontational course: reserving their right to review the position in 1997, but in practice lying low to see how LegCo

performs between 1995 and 1997.

The

My conclusion is that this is a risk we have to take.

arrangements for the elections in 1995 have to be seen in Hong Kong and internationally as fair and based on a significant broadening of the democratic process.

Airport

[The Prime Minister might ask the Governor about the state of

play and the consequences of a row with the Chinese on constitutional issues]

Agree with the Governor's tactics. We should maintain the

initiative by taking the Chinese proposals at face value, turning them into a workable position, and putting them back

to the Chinese.

- I propose in parallel to impress on Qian the need for early and serious discussion to resolve this problem. The Chinese are on weak ground in Hong Kong if they maintain linkage, and they know it.

In practice, the pressure will grow on them to

allow the project to go ahead. We cannot afford to allow our decisions on constitutional issues to be driven by likely Chinese reactions on the airport.

opd(k).NIG

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